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1. Introduction  
This paper examines the growth of microfinance institutions. Over the past 20 years or so 
microfinance institutions have enabled millions of poor people to access financial services 
resulting in increases in living standards and reduced poverty (Ledgerwood, Earne, & Nelson, 
2013). Microfinance institutions have also provided funding for entrepreneurial activity, 
which has led to subsequent gains in investment, employment and wealth creation (Morduch, 
1999). As such, an understanding of the factors determining the growth of microfinance 
institutions is an important endeavour given their importance in promoting financial inclusion 
and providing funding for entrepreneurship. 
Microfinance institutions vary in terms of ownership form, comprising micro-banks, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), cooperatives/credit unions and non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFIs). Differences across ownership forms are likely to lead to differences in 
the strategies and objectives pursued by microfinance institutions.  
Microfinance institutions also vary by commercial orientation. Some microfinance 
institutions act as not-for-profit organizations and focus on providing credit to the very poor 
at relatively generous repayment terms. These institutions seek to cover operating costs. Their 
social mission is one of financial inclusion and poverty reduction. In contrast, other 
microfinance institutions are organised as commercial for-profit financial institutions offering 
traditional financial products to clients across the entire income distribution. These 
microfinance institutions still seek to provide access to finance to poorer communities, but do 
not necessarily offer the level of access to the very poorest segments of society. This has led 
to some commentators questioning whether these for-profit microfinance institutions have 
deviated from their traditional purpose and experienced the so-called mission drift by striving 
to serve better off customers (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009; Ledgerwood et al., 
2013; Mersland & Strøm, 2010).  
In spite of the importance of microfinance institutions in providing access to finance, 
there is only a limited amount of research on the growth of microfinance institutions. This 
paper attempts to fill this gap by exploring the growth of microfinance institutions across a 
large number of countries and complementing the literature that has examined drivers and 
impact of outreach (Cull et al., 2009; Cull & Morduch, 2007; Hermes & Lensink, 2007; 
Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011; Imai, Gaiha, Thapa, & Annim, 2012). 
Prior empirical literature investigating the determinants of firm growth tests Gibrat’s 
Law, which posits that chance or random factors are central in determining the growth of 
individual firms, and in generating any resultant size distribution (Gibrat, 1931). Gibrat’s 
Law comprises a set of testable hypotheses as follows: (i) a firm’s growth rate is not related 
of its size; (ii) a firm’s growth rate is not persistent; and (iii) a firm’s growth variability is 
independent of its size. If these hypotheses are upheld, a firm’s growth rate is not 
deterministic (i.e. follows a random walk pattern) and therefore it is independent of any other 
observable characteristics such as firm size or prior growth.  
Empirical evidence related to Gibrat’s Law is extensive for manufacturing and 
financial services industries and provides rather mixed results. Some studies provide 
supporting evidence for Gibrat’s Law, while others finding a systematic relationship between 
firm size and growth.
1
  
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the size and growth of 
microfinance institutions. Specifically, we investigate the following questions: (i) Is there 
empirical evidence of a size-growth relationship for microfinance institutions? (ii) Does 
microfinance institution growth persist over time? (iii) Does the variability of growth vary 
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 Early studies testing Gibrat’s Law include Hart and Prais (1956) and Simon and Bonini (1958). Useful reviews 
of this literature for non-financial firms can be found in Audretsch, Klomp, Santarelli, and Thurik (2004), Coad 
(2009), Lipczynski, Goddard, and Wilson (2017) and Sutton (1997). 
across the size distribution of microfinance institutions? (iv) What other factors drive 
microfinance institution growth?  
In order to answer these questions, we construct an extensive data set comprising 
microfinance institutions located in 120 countries over the period 2000 to 2014. Our 
measures of size (total assets and number of active microfinance borrowers) are used as an 
input to compute the growth measures used as dependent variables in our empirical analysis. 
This allows us to both complement and augment prior literature that has examined the 
determinants of the level (rather than the growth) of microfinance institution outreach.  
We investigate the impact of microfinance institution size on growth, and augment 
this with a set control variables (in addition to size) used in prior studies of financial 
institution growth (Goddard, McKillop, & Wilson, 2002; Shehzad, De Haan, & Scholtens, 
2013). These include age, profitability (ROA), efficiency (cost-income ratio), solvency 
(capital-to-total assets ratio), bad debt and an indicator variable capturing whether 
microfinance institutions in a given country are subject to prudential regulation and 
supervision.  
Managerial incentives are likely vary by the ownership form and commercial 
orientation of microfinance institutions (Galema, Lensink, & Mersland, 2012). Therefore, we 
also present the results of our estimable model by ownership form and commercial 
orientation.  
Due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable and time-series dimension in the 
study of the growth of microfinance institutions, we use the system GMM estimation for 
dynamic panel data (see Blundell and Bond (1998)). We conduct both a univariate and 
multivariate analyses of the size–growth relationship to account for the effect of financial and 
non-financial factors on the growth rate of microfinance institutions. To examine whether 
growth rates differ across ownership form and by commercial orientation, the estimations are 
repeated for micro-banks, cooperatives/credit unions, NBFIs and NGOs, and for profit and 
not-for-profit microfinance institutions. This approach allows us to identify whether 
differences in operational structure and objective function affect the growth rates of 
microfinance institutions. 
Our findings suggest that we cannot reject the hypotheses that microfinance 
institution growth is independent of size and cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no 
persistence in microfinance growth. However, we strongly reject the hypotheses that 
microfinance institution growth variability is independent of size. Our results remain 
consistent when disaggregated by commercial orientation and ownership form. The only 
exception is for non-profit microfinance institutions and credit unions/cooperative 
microfinance institutions where we find evidence of negative growth persistence (in total 
assets). Our results also suggest that other factors such as age (new microfinance institutions 
grow faster than young and mature counterparts), level of bad debt (which is associated to 
lower growth rates), efficiency, and regulation exert an important influence on the growth of 
microfinance institutions.  
Our study makes four contributions to the literature. First, by focusing on 
microfinance institutions, we contribute to a literature (reviewed in Section 2) that has tested 
Gibrat’s Law for the mainstream financial services industry. Second, we extend previous 
empirical research that examines the determinants of the level of microfinance institution 
outreach (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2011; Hartarska, Shen, & Mersland, 2013; 
Hermes et al., 2011). Third, we present evidence on the drivers of growth for microfinance 
institutions with different ownership forms and commercial orientation. As such we 
contribute to an established literature which suggests that ownership form contributes to 
differences in financial performance across shareholder based and mutually owned 
organizations (Ferri, Kalmi, & Kerola, 2014; Iannotta, Nocera, & Sironi, 2007). Fourth, to 
account for the dynamic effects between size and growth along with any endogeneity issues, 
we employ system GMM estimation for dynamic panel models. Overall, the results of this 
study provide a detailed picture of the growth patterns for a worldwide sample of 
microfinance institutions for the period 2000 to 2014.
2
  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background to the 
current study and a review of prior literature. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. In 
Section 4, we discuss the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 provides concluding 
comments.  
 
2. Background and Literature 
Background 
The lack of access to affordable financial services is one of the underlying reasons for 
the levels of poverty observed in many developing countries. Microfinance institutions offer 
financial services, for the most part loans, to individuals and groups of people in order to 
meet their short-term consumption and investment needs. Microfinance institutions provide 
access to finance to those individuals (lacking credit histories and collateral) who are 
normally excluded from mainstream financial services (Cull et al., 2009; Hermes et al., 2011; 
Ledgerwood et al., 2013; Morduch, 1999).
3
 
Microfinance institutions have adopted different ownership forms worldwide. These 
include Micro-banks, Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), cooperatives/credit unions and 
NGOs. Micro-banks and NBFIs are shareholder-oriented organizations targeting traditional 
financial performance metrics (Galema et al., 2012; Mersland, 2009). Micro-banks have 
flexible capital structures (funded by both socially and financially motivated investors) and 
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 Countries covered in our sample are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
3
 Recent estimates suggest that the microfinance sector reached 211 million clients at the end of 2013, and 
approximately 54% of those clients were living in extreme poverty (Reed et al., 2015). 
are commercially oriented institutions. NFBIs are similar to Micro-banks, and account for all 
other types of microfinance institutions with limitations on the range of financial products 
that they can offer (e.g. ability to take deposits and sell insurance products).  
Cooperatives/credit unions are not-for-profit organizations. Members are the owners 
of these institutions and exert control over strategic decisions. Surpluses are retained to build 
up capital or distribute to members directly via cash dividends or indirectly via low cost 
access to credit and deposit services. Access to external funding is limited and owners are 
involved in the management of the microfinance institution. NGOs are also not-for-profit 
organizations, but in contrast to credit unions are characterized by a non-distribution 
constraint (Servin, Lensink, & Van Den Berg, 2012).
4
 The range of financial services 
provided by NGOs is rather limited given that these institutions cannot accept deposits. The 
dependence on external funding such as grants and subsidies (rather than shareholder capital) 
make them less responsive to changes in demand and supply conditions. NGOs are 
commonly associated with lower profitability, smaller loan sizes and higher costs per dollar 
lent compared to commercially oriented micro-banks (Cull et al., 2009). 
The mission of most microfinance institutions is based on the so-called “double bottom-
line” approach: to achieve simultaneously financial self-sufficiency and social objectives 
(Hermes et al., 2011). However, financial objectives tend to be more important for Micro-
banks/NBFIs relative to their Credit Unions/NGOs counterparts. Microfinance institutions are 
also classified in terms of their commercial orientation as for-profit (shareholder-based 
organizations) and not-for-profit microfinance institutions. Commercial micro-banks usually 
share a for-profit orientation; however, NGOs are more likely to have a non-profit status 
(Cull et al., 2009). Périlleux, Hudon, and Bloy (2012) find that ownership structure of 
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 Galema et al. (2012) argue that managerial discretion is more prevalent in non-governmental organizations 
than in other types of microfinance institutions. 
microfinance institutions matters in the allocation of surplus to stakeholders. The authors 
suggest that non-profit organizations and shareholders-held microfinance institutions tend to 
keep their surplus, while cooperatives/credit unions show a preference to distribute surpluses 
to providers and employees.  
Literature 
Gibrat (1931) was the first to develop the view that a firm’s growth in each period follows 
a random pattern. A relatively large body of literature has tested the validity of the Gibrat’s 
Law based on three testable hypotheses: (H1) firm growth is not related to size; (H2) firm 
growth is not persistent; and (H3) the variability in firm growth is not related to firm size. 
Thus failing to reject these three hypotheses provides empirical support to Gibrat’s Law that 
firm growth occurs mostly due to chance.  
Gibrat’s Law has been widely tested in manufacturing and services industries, and to a 
lesser extent for mainstream financial intermediaries operating in advanced economies.
5
 
Early studies using data from 1930s through to the early 1970s investigate patterns of growth 
for US banks and find an inverse size-growth relationship (Alhadeff & Alhadeff, 1964; 
Rhoades & Yeats, 1974). Tschoegl (1983) tests empirically the relationship between size and 
growth using the 100 largest banks worldwide in the 1970s. His results suggest that: growth 
is unrelated to bank size; growth is not persistent; and large banks tend to have less variable 
growth rates than smaller banks.  
Wilson and Williams (2000) find no significant relationship between size (proxied by 
total assets, total equity and value of off balance sheet activities) and growth for European 
banks during the period 1990-1996. The authors do find however a negative size-growth 
relationship for Italian banks. Furthermore, their results suggest that large banks tend to 
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 Coad (2009), Lipczynski et al. (2017) and Sutton (1997) provide useful reviews of this literature. 
exhibit less variable growth rates compared to small banks. Goddard et al. (2002) investigate 
the determinants of the growth of US credit unions between 1990 and 1999. The authors find 
evidence of a positive size-growth relationship, persistence in growth rates is negative, and a 
negative relationship between variability in growth rates and size. Goddard, Molyneux, and 
Wilson (2004) examine the growth of the largest banks operating in France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and the UK in the 1990s. The authors find that growth rates for larger banks is on 
average higher compared to smaller counterparts. The authors also provide some evidence 
suggesting that banks exhibit positive persistence in growth. Ward and McKillop (2005) test 
Gibrat’s Law for a sample of credit unions in the UK over the period 1994 to 2000. The 
authors find that: smaller credit unions grew faster than larger counterparts; growth is 
persistent over time; and smaller credit unions have more variable growth than larger 
counterparts. A recent study by Shehzad et al. (2013), exploring growth determinants for a 
sample of 148 banking firms operating in OECD and developing countries finds that Gibrat’s 
Law holds for the banking industry over the period 1988-2010.  
 
3. Data and Methods 
Data 
We collect financial and non-financial data for microfinance institutions worldwide 
from the MIX Market database. This database has been used widely in prior microfinance 
research (Barry & Tacneng, 2014; Bogan, 2012; Postelnicu & Hermes, 2016). Microfinance 
institutions report financial data to MIX on a voluntary basis. To ensure the quality of data, 
the MIX database uses a diamond rating scheme to indicate the level of disclosure by MFIs. 
The ratings go from one to five diamonds, with five diamonds indicating that an MFI adheres 
to the highest disclosure standards.
6
 
Following previous literature, we limit our sample to microfinance institutions that are 
assigned three or more diamonds (Assefa, Hermes, & Meesters, 2013; Barry & Tacneng, 
2014). Our data span the period 2000 through 2014 and includes microfinance institutions of 
different ownership form (micro-banks, NBFI, cooperatives/credit unions and NGOs). Our 
sample includes a heterogeneous set of microfinance institutions in terms of relevant 
characteristics such as size, growth, profitability, ownership form and operating in different 
geographical areas.
7
 We winsorize all variables at the 1% of the distribution (top and bottom) 
to remove outliers in the data set.
8
 After these changes, our final sample includes almost 
13,000 observations. Due to the unbalanced nature of our data and missing values for some 
variables, the number of usable observations varies across the models estimated in Section 4. 
We employ two size measures in our empirical analysis: total assets and total number 
of active borrowers. In line with previous studies, we rely on total assets as our primary size 
measure. One of the most important characteristics of microfinance institutions is the 
provision of financial services and products to the poor and therefore the expansion of the 
assets can be considered as one of its main strategic objectives. As an alternative size 
measure, we also use the total number of active microfinance borrowers. Achieving higher 
growth rates in the number of active borrowers represents a key outreach target for most of 
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 One diamond is granted to microfinance institutions with a visible profile at MIX Market. Two diamonds 
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7
 The analysis of entry and exit decisions of market participants is beyond the scope of the paper. Nevertheless, 
this dataset reflects the market structure and different levels of voluntary reporting of microfinance institutions 
operating in different countries. 
8
 Winsorizing all variables at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 or 10
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles do not change our main findings, 
suggesting that our results are not driven by outliers. 
the microfinance institutions. By comparing the results based on these measures, we are able 
to analyse the relationships between size and growth process from two different perspectives 
which are particularly relevant for microfinance institutions. In this regard, it could be argued 
that microfinance institutions pursuing higher levels of outreach are expected to achieve 
specific levels of growth by including certain objectives in terms of total assets and number 
of active borrowers.  
Table 1a presents the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, percentiles, 
minimum/maximum values and number of observations) of the variables included in the 
regression. The mean values displayed in the Table indicate that an average MFI in our 
sample has a ROE, OER, CAR and PaR30 of 0.58%, 28.5%, 35.87% and 6.51% respectively. 
 
<Insert Table 1a about here> 
 
Table 1b presents descriptive statistics by ownership form and commercial 
orientation. On average micro-banks and NBFIs are larger than credit unions and NGOs. 
Credit Unions and NBFI, however, are similar in terms of ROA. Micro-banks enjoy higher 
levels of financial performance. Efficiency, capital and bad debt ratios are similar across 
different ownership forms. All ownership forms experience positive average growth in assets. 
For-profit microfinance institutions stand out with an average growth in assets and active 
borrowers during the period of 3.08% and 3.54% respectively.  
 
<Insert Table 1b about here> 
 
Estimable model 
Our econometric model describes the relationship between microfinance institution 
size and growth as follows:  
 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
Where 𝑔𝑖𝑡 = log⁡(𝑆𝑖𝑡) − log⁡(𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) is the (logarithmic) growth of microfinance institution i 
between years t-1 and t. 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 indicates the (logarithmic) size of microfinance institution i (in 
terms of total assets or number of active borrowers) in year t-1, and 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛿𝑡, 𝜗𝑗 ⁡are individual, 
time and regional fixed effects, respectively.
9
 𝜃 captures any size-growth relationship for 
microfinance institutions. To study the influence of past growth on current growth, we 
introduce a lagged dependent variable along with a set of additional control variables as 
follows: 
 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃(𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜌(𝑔𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
 
If microfinance institution specific effects are heterogeneous (𝛼𝑖 ≠ 𝛼), 𝜃⁡becomes an 
inconsistent and biased estimator. Following Goddard et al. (2002), Goddard et al. (2004) and 
Shehzad et al. (2013) we address this issue by taking the difference of lagged size and initial 
microfinance size in Equation (2) and adding the individual fixed effects (𝛼𝑖) to the error 
component (𝜖𝑖𝑡) as follows: 
 
 𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
′ ) + 𝜌(𝑔𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜗𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (3) 
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 The regions are Latin America and The Caribbean, Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the 
Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia.  
Where 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
′ = 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑖0 and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑆𝑖0. This provides an unbiased and 
consistent estimation of the model. Similar to Goddard et al. (2004), 𝑔𝑖𝑡 is normalized by 
removing from each observation the cross-sectional average in each year. Although 
microfinance institutions share a common social mandate, there are still substantial 
differences in terms of their operational and financial characteristics. To account for these 
differences we include a set of time-varying control variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡). First, we include a 
categorical variable that captures the stage of the microfinance institution in its life cycle 
(new, young and mature) which is expected to influence its growth patterns. For example, 
microfinance institutions that are mature and perhaps less innovative than their younger 
counterparts could face challenges in sustaining higher growth rates. Second, we include the 
Return on Assets (ROA) as internally retained funds are likely to exert a positive effect on the 
growth rate of microfinance institutions. Third, we control by the level of operational 
efficiency of the microfinance institution. A low operational efficiency (high cost-income 
ratio) is likely to be associated with inefficient performance, and could have a negative effect 
on growth. Fourth, the capital-to-assets ratio is included to account for differences in levels of 
solvency between microfinance institutions. The expected relationship between capital and 
growth rate could be either positive or negative. Microfinance institutions with higher capital 
ratios are likely to be perceived as less risky, and thus able to attract funding and follow a 
sustainable growth trajectory. Equally, if microfinance institutions hold capital well above the 
optimum level, then profitable opportunities may be foregone and thus finance for future 
growth inhibited. Fifth, we include the portfolio at risk over 30 days as a percentage of the 
total loan portfolio (PaR30). The relationship between bad debt and growth is expected to be 
negative as it could reflect poor risk management strategies of the microfinance institution, 
which in turn can damage its future growth prospects. Finally, we include lagged GDP 
growth in country k (where microfinance i operates) and year t to control for macroeconomic 
factors affecting the microfinance sector.  
Equation (3) allows us to test empirically Gibrat’s Law’s three hypothesis: (H1) 
whether microfinance institution growth is unrelated to size, which consists of testing 
𝐻0: 𝜃 = 0, with the alternative that 𝐻0: 𝜃 ≠ 0. 𝜃 = 0⁡implies that there is no relationship 
between size and growth. 𝜃 ≠ 0⁡implies a positive or negative size–growth relationship. (H2) 
the hypothesis that growth rates are not persistence is tested by the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0 
under the alternative that⁡𝐻0: 𝜌 ≠ 0. The sign of ?̂? indicates if persistence is either positive or 
negative. Finally, following Goddard et al. (2002), we test whether growth variability is 
independent of microfinance size (H3) by using a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, under the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity of error terms. The test relies on an auxiliary regression 
where the squared residuals obtained from estimating equation (3) are regressed on the 
squared lagged size variable. A rejection of the null implies that growth variability depend on 
the microfinance size. The sign of the estimated squared lagged size variable reflects the 
direction of the size-variability of growth relationship. Thus, failing to reject H1, H2 and H3 
implies that the growth patterns of firms follow a random walk, verifying the Gibrat’s Law. 
Due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable in Equation (3), we use the two-
step system GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998) with corrected standard errors 
(Windmeijer, 2005) to estimate equation (3). The consistency of the system GMM estimator 
depends on two conditions: (i) the validity of the instruments and (ii) the absence of second-
order serial correlation (AR(2)) in the differenced residuals. The first condition is tested by 
using the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions under the null that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term. To avoid the problems caused by instrument proliferation, 
the number of instruments is reported in all Tables and is always lower than the number of 
cross-sectional units (Roodman, 2009a, 2009b). The second condition is tested by using the 
serial correlation Arellano-Bond (AB) test (Arellano & Bond, 1991). An insignificant AB test 
for AR(2) autocorrelation indicates that the model is correctly specified. Results of both tests 
are reported at the bottom of the Tables. We also report in all Tables a multicollinearity test 
(i.e. variance inflation factor (VIF)) using a linear regression model (OLS).
10
 Finally, we 
estimate the models using robust standard errors clustered at country level to account for 
correlation of errors within countries. 
 
4. Results  
Tables 2 and 3 summarise the results of estimating the univariate (model 1) and 
multivariate (model 2) growth models. Total assets and number of active borrowers are used 
as size measures. The first row reports the estimated coefficients, which identify the size-
growth relationship. The second row includes estimated coefficients that reflect growth 
persistence from one period to the next. All tables report the heteroscedasticity LM test (LM 
test) along with the estimated lagged squared size coefficient (Hetero). The sign of the 
coefficient describes the direction of the relationship between size and variability of growth 
rates. Estimates for the full sample and by ownership forms are also reported in each table. 
To test our first hypotheses that microfinance institution growth is independent of 
size, we examine the coefficient of lagged logarithmic microfinance institution size. Results 
for univariate and multivariate models show that the coefficient on size is insignificant both 
in our full sample and for each of the four ownership forms. The lack of significance of any 
size-growth relationship suggests that there are no significant advantages accruing to larger 
microfinance institutions (e.g. in terms of scale economies) either in terms of higher levels of 
lending or the number of active microfinance borrowers.  
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 Table A2 in the Appendix reports the correlation matrix of the full set of variables employed in the empirical 
analysis. The correlation between covariates used in our empirical models is low.  
We also test the hypothesis of non-persistence of growth for microfinance institution. 
Although the analysis of the full sample for total assets (Table 2) does not show signs of 
persistence, we find some evidence of negative persistence (mean-reversion) in certain types 
of ownership form. In particular, the results imply that high levels of growth in assets of 
cooperatives/credit unions leads to below-average growth in assets the next period. In the 
case of number of active borrowers as a size measure (Table 3), our univariate regressions 
show evidence of positive persistence of growth for the full sample only. However, this 
coefficient is insignificant in our preferred multivariate model and across the different 
ownership forms. Overall, our findings imply that prior microfinance institution growth (in 
terms of number of active borrowers) has no predictive power for current microfinance 
growth.  
To examine the effect of microfinance institution size on variability of growth, we 
consider the heteroscedasticity test reported in Tables 2 and 3. We reject the null hypothesis 
of homoscedastic growth across all models, which points out the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and describe a negative relationship between size and growth variability. 
Previous empirical studies have reported similar results for other industries (Goddard et al., 
2002). This result suggests that small (less diversified) microfinance institutions may be more 
vulnerable to economic fluctuations and therefore subject to greater variability in growth 
(Dunne & Hughes, 1994).  
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here> 
 
Finally, we discuss the effect of the control variables on microfinance growth in the 
multivariate regression. For the growth models reported in Tables 2 and 3, our results indicate 
that age is a key determinant of growth, with new microfinance institutions growing faster 
than young and mature counterparts. Our results also suggest that an increase in the cost-to- 
income ratio (efficiency) increases the growth of cooperatives/credit unions. Our results 
suggest that bad debt tends to reduce growth of MFIs, but particularly in the case of NGOs. 
Finally, we find that regulation of microfinance institutions exerts a positive effect on asset 
growth and growth in the number of active borrowers in the case of NGOs. 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the models by considering the commercial 
orientation of microfinance institutions. In general terms, profit-oriented microfinance 
institutions include shareholder oriented institutions such as Micro-banks and NBFIs, while 
not-for-profit oriented microfinance institutions are mainly constituted as cooperatives/credit 
unions and NGOs.  
Table 4 presents the results for our estimated models for both groups and two measures of 
size. Wald Chi-squared tests suggest that all variables are jointly significant at the 1% level 
and should not be dropped from the models. The Hansen test as well as the AR(2) test always 
appear insignificant, implying that the models are correctly specified. Similar to previous 
results, we find that microfinance institution growth is independent of microfinance size. We 
also find evidence of a negative persistence of growth in assets for not-for-profit 
microfinance institutions, which suggests that past growth rates have predictive power for 
current growth rates. Finally, and in common with the results of the rest of our results 
discussed above, microfinance institution growth variability is related to size. Table 5 
presents a summary of the main results of the estimated models. 
 
<Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here> 
 
 We also carry out a battery of robustness checks. First, we restrict our sample to those 
microfinance institutions with at least nine years of available data (which correspond to the 
median value of the sample distribution). Second, we restrict the sample to countries with at 
least 36 microfinance institutions (which corresponds to the median value of the distribution 
in our sample). Third, we limit our analysis to countries with at least 36 microfinance 
institutions and at least nine years of available data. Results using different types of 
consistent panel remain unchanged, suggesting that our key findings are not driven by entry 
and exit of microfinance institutions in the sample. Results are reported in Tables A3 and A4 
in the Appendix. Finally, we consider the case that disclosure of information is endogenous. 
It could be because the disclosure of information to the MIX database is on a voluntary basis 
with a rating scheme (i.e. diamonds) indicating the level of disclosure. This might generate 
self-selection bias in that those microfinance institutions providing more disclosure are the 
more developed and that experienced higher growth in the past. We conduct a robustness 
check to test whether self-selection or endogeneity of disclosure could be affecting our 
results. To this end, we estimate regressions including the lagged level of disclosure as 
control variable and treat it as endogenous within our GMM dynamic panel framework. The 
results are reported in Table A5 in the Appendix and are similar to those presented in Tables 
2-3.
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5. Conclusion 
Microfinance institutions play an important role in many countries as providers of 
financial services to the poor. Employing dynamic panel data methods we assess the growth 
                                                          
11
 We also explore the possibility that synergies between commercial orientation and ownership model could 
affect our key findings. In particular, we include a full set of interaction terms to take into account 
simultaneously the operational structure (i.e. ownership models) and the objective functions (i.e. commercial 
orientation) of MFIs. Our main findings remain unchanged. In order to conserve space, we do not report the 
results of these additional regressions. These results are available from the authors upon request. We thank a 
referee for suggesting this additional test.  
of microfinance institutions worldwide during the period 2000-2014. Our analysis allows us 
to test three hypotheses that, if accepted, imply that the size distribution of microfinance 
institutions is the outcome of a sequence of random shocks. We use two alternative measures 
of size: total assets (which is related to the objective of increasing the provision of loans) and 
number of active microfinance borrowers (which is associated with social outreach targets). 
Our findings suggest that: microfinance institution growth is independent of size; 
microfinance institution growth is not persistent; and that the variability in microfinance 
institution growth decreases with size. These results are robust with respect to ownership 
form and commercial orientation.  
Overall, these results imply that Gibrat’s Law does not hold for microfinance institutions. 
Additionally, our results identify systematic factors which influence microfinance institution 
growth. Specifically, microfinance institutions that are: new; more efficient; with lower levels 
of bad debt; and regulated record higher growth levels, after controlling for other 
determinants of growth. Overall, the results of this study are of interest to academics, 
policymakers and regulators in better understanding the dynamics of asset growth and 
borrower outreach in the microfinance industry.  
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Table 1a. Summary statistics   
 
 
 
Mean SD p5 p50 p95 Min Max N 
Total assets (US$ 000) 38,600 116,000 139 4,028 195,000 21 834,000 12,801 
Growth in assets (%) 1.85 3.44 -1.34 1.38 6.52 -50.82 52.70 10,039 
Number of active borrowers 41,916 123,128 165 6,685 180,885 30 932,286 12,828 
Growth in borrowers (%) 2.53 6.94 -3.95 1.49 12.09 -64.92 99.32 10,069 
Age 2.42 0.78 1.00 3.00 3.00 1 3 13,032 
ROA (%) 0.58 10.72 -18.40 1.91 12.90 -55.34 23.05 10,368 
OER (%) 28.50 26.71 6.12 19.65 80.38 2.54 163.82 10,373 
CAR (%) 35.87 28.07 2.55 27.86 93.81 -22.43 100.00 12,717 
PaR30 (%) 6.51 9.65 0.00 3.56 23.97 0.00 59.62 10,712 
GDP growth (%) 5.30 3.20 0.09 5.25 10.26 -4.70 14.04 13,299 
 
Notes: Table 1a reports for each variable in our sample the mean, standard deviations (SD), the fifth (p5), fiftieth (p50), ninety-fifth percentile (p50), 
minimum, maximum values and number of observations for the period 2000 – 2014. Active borrowers are those who have an outstanding loan balance or are 
responsible for repaying a loan. Age is a categorical variable (1: New (1 to 4 years); 2: Young (5 to 8 years): and 3: Mature (More than 8 years)). Return on 
Assets (ROA): Net income/total assets, efficiency ratio (OER): Operating costs/average gross portfolio. OER measures the costs necessary for an institution 
to provide credit. The lower the ratio, the more efficient the institution is. Ratio of solvency (CAR): Total equity/total assets. PaR30 is defined as the 
proportion of a loan portfolio that is more than 30 days in arrears and it is measured as follows: (Outstanding balance on arrears over 30 days + total gross 
outstanding refinanced (restructured) portfolio)/total gross portfolio. It shows the part of the portfolio affected by outstanding payments, where there is a risk 
that they will not be repaid. GDP growth is from the World Development Indicators (WDIs) published by the World Bank. Please refer to MIX market for an 
exact definition of microfinance-related variables (https://www.themix.org/resource/glossary/glossary).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b. Summary statistics by ownership type and commercial orientation  
 
 
 
Ownership Type Commercial orientation 
Micro-bank 
Cooperatives/ 
credit unions 
NBFI NGO 
Registered in a non-
profit status 
Registered as a 
for-profit 
institution 
Number of observations 1,458 2,395 4,581 4,836 7,630 5,104 
Percentage of the sample (%) 10.99 18.05 34.52 36.44 59.92 40.08 
 
    
  
Means and standard deviations (in italics)       
 
    
  
Total assets (US$ 000) 168,000 21,500 34,400 12,700 22,200 66,000 
 
242,000 73,000 97,600 47,300 78,000 157,000 
Growth in assets (%) 1.57 1.92 2.09 1.68 1.72 2.01 
 2.71 3.64 3.85 3.11 3.21 3.54 
Number of active borrowers 94,272 11,189 47,135 36,830 31,157 61,800 
 192,462 41,935 132,130 108,898 98,261 155,070 
Growth in borrowers (%) 2.46 2.41 3.06 2.09 2.06 3.08 
 5.53 7.55 7.90 6.01 6.21 7.62 
Age 2.33 2.45 2.23 2.62 2.57 2.23 
 
0.84 0.75 0.83 0.67 0.69 0.84 
ROA (%) 1.66 1.02 0.99 -0.31 0.53 0.96 
 
6.96 7.68 10.77 12.54 10.75 10.14 
OER (%) 25.06 20.39 30.00 31.77 27.47 29.69 
 
22.87 21.62 27.12 28.54 25.89 26.75 
CAR (%) 25.68 25.46 39.52 40.54 36.54 34.56 
 
21.53 21.65 28.58 29.89 28.49 26.97 
PaR30 (%) 6.12 7.92 6.02 6.42 6.63 6.21 
 
9.84 10.00 9.19 9.77 9.55 9.58 
 
Notes: The Table reports summary statistics for the period 2000 – 2014. Table 1a above and MIX market provide detailed definitions of ownership forms 
(https://www.themix.org/resource/glossary/glossary).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Dynamic panel estimation results (Dependent variable: growth in assets)  
 
 
All Micro-banks Cooperatives/credit unions NBFI NGO 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
θ: log(Assets (t–1)) 0.015 0.020 0.005 0.007 -0.024 -0.027 0.007 0.020 0.035 0.016 
 
(0.85) (1.43) (0.18) (0.30) (-0.95) (-0.90) (0.24) (0.74) (1.27) (0.57) 
ρ: Growth in assets (t–1) 0.074 -0.051 0.062 0.130 -0.133*** -0.137*** 0.017 0.010 -0.030 0.006 
 (0.71) (-1.17) (0.50) (1.11) (-5.72) (-3.98) (0.14) (0.36) (-0.25) (0.04) 
Age: Young  -1.020*** 
 
-0.230 
 
-0.758 
 
-0.930*** 
 
-1.347** 
 
 (-5.89) 
 
(-0.75) 
 
(-1.59) 
 
(-4.10) 
 
(-2.68) 
Age: Mature  -1.271*** 
 
-0.383 
 
-1.250** 
 
-1.179*** 
 
-1.398** 
 
 (-6.60) 
 
(-1.22) 
 
(-2.42) 
 
(-5.13) 
 
(-2.50) 
ROA (t-1)  -0.005 
 
-0.001 
 
0.023 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.004 
 
 (-0.93) 
 
(-0.04) 
 
(1.10) 
 
(-1.46) 
 
(-0.44) 
OER (t-1)  -0.001 
 
0.005 
 
0.015* 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.002 
 
 (-0.36) 
 
(1.01) 
 
(1.83) 
 
(-1.19) 
 
(-0.41) 
CAR (t-1)  0.001 
 
0.003 
 
0.005 
 
0.004 
 
-0.001 
 
 (0.99) 
 
(0.78) 
 
(0.89) 
 
(1.54) 
 
(-0.20) 
PaR30 (t-1)  -0.037*** 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.050*** 
 
-0.039*** 
 
 (-7.22) 
 
(-1.42) 
 
(-0.55) 
 
(-5.95) 
 
(-5.29) 
Regulated (YES)  0.212** 
 
-0.039 
 
0.306 
 
0.242* 
 
0.365** 
   (3.18) 
 
(-0.22) 
 
(1.20) 
 
(1.86) 
 
(3.23) 
GDP growth (t-1)  -0.033*** -0.029 -0.018 -0.038** -0.039 
  (-3.45)  (-1.27)  (-0.62)  (-2.54)  (-1.64) 
Hetero -0.060*** -0.039*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.034 -0.008 -0.087*** -0.038*** -0.075*** -0.072*** 
LM test 54.24*** 27.99*** 53.59*** 15.74*** 1.17 0.06 31.04*** 10.93*** 39.95*** 30.28*** 
Observations 7,920 6,941 924 794 1,155 962 2,835 2,533 2,997 2,652 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hansen J statistic 24.0 16.4 21.3 18.2 24.4 27.2 34.8 25.7 20.4 24.4 
Hansen test p-value 0.20 0.63 0.32 0.51 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.37 0.18 
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) p-value 0.07 0.21 0.37 0.28 0.21 0.31 0.39 0.25 0.78 0.44 
Number of instruments 41 49 41 49 40 48 41 49 41 49 
Wald Chi-squared test 29.2* 242.1*** 102.3*** 142.7*** 60.5*** 83.1*** 22.5 121.3*** 22.9 137.9*** 
Mean VIF 3.26 2.99 2.40 2.46 4.23 3.55 3.53 3.30 3.37 3.17 
Notes: Table 2 reports estimated coefficients from Eq. (4). Z-scores are shown in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Intercept, time / regional dummies are not reported.  ‘Hetero’ 
reports the estimated coefficient on the lagged squared size variable.  The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic is reported below. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second–order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residual. Lagged dependent variable is instrumented by lagged levels dated t−3 (first-differences equation) and by lagged first-differences (levels equation). 
Lagged control variables (total assets, active borrowers, ROA, OER, CAR, PaR30) are used as instruments for the levels equation only, since they are assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
contemporaneous error term but become endogenous in first differences. To avoid using an excessive number of instruments, exogenous variables (i.e. age, regulated, lagged GDP growth, 
regions and year) are used directly as instruments in the level equation. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10%  levels, respectively.  
Table 3.  Dynamic panel estimation results (Dependent variable: Growth in borrowers)  
 
 All Micro-bank Cooperatives/credit unions NBFI NGO 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
θ: log(Active borrowers (t–1)) -0.038 -0.012 -0.050 -0.006 -0.096 -0.031 0.047 -0.015 0.045 -0.035 
 (-0.94) (-0.31) (-0.52) (-0.08) (-1.15) (-0.39) (0.69) (-0.25) (0.76) (-0.62) 
ρ: Growth in borrowers (t–1) 0.215** 0.022 0.256 0.138 0.148 -0.243 0.104 0.127 0.001 0.033 
 (2.66) (0.24) (1.61) (0.56) (0.81) (-1.50) (0.94) (1.02) (0.01) (0.20) 
Age: Young  -1.886**  1.219  -2.511*  -1.459  -1.804 
  (-2.79)  (1.04)  (-1.81)  (-1.61)  (-1.55) 
Age: Mature  -2.294**  0.394  -2.953**  -1.659*  -2.425* 
  (-3.21)  (0.29)  (-1.97)  (-1.73)  (-1.94) 
ROA (t-1)  -0.001  -0.000  0.037  -0.014  0.005 
  (-0.05)  (-0.01)  (0.81)  (-0.67)  (0.37) 
OER (t-1)  0.006  0.009  0.044**  0.005  -0.003 
  (1.31)  (0.56)  (2.58)  (0.58)  (-0.40) 
CAR (t-1)  0.003  -0.009  0.001  0.000  0.004 
  (0.93)  (-0.76)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.74) 
PaR30 (t-1)  -0.051***  -0.043  -0.082**  -0.037*  -0.056*** 
  (-5.12)  (-1.45)  (-3.02)  (-1.91)  (-3.63) 
Regulated (YES)  0.505***  -0.214  -0.366  0.270  0.998*** 
  (3.80)  (-0.50)  (-0.80)  (0.98)  (4.25) 
GDP growth (t-1)  -0.039*  -0.010  -0.093  -0.010  -0.050 
  (-1.90)  (-0.22)  (-1.27)  (-0.32)  (-1.41) 
Hetero -0.372*** -0.300*** -0.224*** -0.126*** -0.453*** -0.292*** -0.538*** -0.469*** -0.205*** -0.165*** 
LM test 141.70*** 125.42*** 19.17*** 25.34*** 15.16*** 16.26*** 79.22*** 93.51*** 19.74*** 12.17*** 
Observations 7,963 6,848 932 773 1,148 938 2,859 2,515 3,012 2,622 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hansen J statistic 27.5 25.7 19.0 18.4 21.3 14.2 19.0 22.5 20.9 15.5 
Hansen test p-value 0.10 0.14 0.46 0.49 0.27 0.72 0.46 0.26 0.34 0.69 
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) p-value 0.18 0.96 0.19 0.32 0.96 0.13 0.79 0.84 0.85 0.57 
Number of instruments 41 49 41 49 40 48 41 49 41 49 
Wald Chi-squared test 107.2*** 223.7*** 30.8* 79.2*** 76.6*** 93.5*** 52.0*** 147.3*** 29.3*** 141.7*** 
Mean VIF 3.43 3.10 2.42 2.47 4.61 3.82 3.76 3.41 3.55 3.31 
Notes: Table 3 reports estimated coefficients from Eq. (4). Z-scores are shown in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Intercept, time / regional dummies are not reported.  ‘Hetero’ 
reports the estimated coefficient on the lagged squared size variable.  The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic is reported below. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second–order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residual. Lagged dependent variable is instrumented by lagged levels dated t−3 (first-differences equation) and by lagged first-differences (levels equation). 
Lagged control variables (total assets, active borrowers, ROA, OER, CAR, PaR30) are used as instruments for the levels equation only, since they are assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
contemporaneous error term but become endogenous in first differences. To avoid using an excessive number of instruments, exogenous variables (i.e. age, regulated, lagged GDP growth, 
regions and year) are used directly as instruments in the level equation. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10%  levels, respectively. 
  
Table 4.  Dynamic panel estimation results by commercial orientation 
 
 
DV: Growth in assets DV: Growth in borrowers 
 
Not-for-profit Profit Not-for-profit Profit 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
θ: log(Assets (t–1))  0.028 0.022 -0.012 0.025     
 (1.53) (1.40) (-0.36) (0.86)     
ρ: Growth in assets (t–1) -0.061* -0.109** 0.242 0.021     
 
(-1.77) (-2.15) (1.44) (0.12)     
log(Active borrowers (t–1))     0.037 -0.032 -0.055 -0.026 
     (0.58) (-0.62) (-1.01) (-0.58) 
Growth in borrowers (t–1)     -0.021 0.023 0.274** 0.128 
     (-0.13) (0.16) (2.42) (1.16) 
Age: Young 
 
-1.443*** 
 
-0.565  -1.504  -1.104 
  
(-5.47) 
 
(-1.54)  (-1.39)  (-1.47) 
Age: Mature 
 
-1.605*** 
 
-0.908*  -1.895*  -1.415* 
  
(-5.79) 
 
(-1.89)  (-1.73)  (-1.71) 
ROA (t-1) 
 
0.001 
 
-0.008  0.018  -0.022 
  
(0.20) 
 
(-1.40)  (1.22)  (-1.22) 
OER (t-1) 
 
0.004 
 
-0.002  0.007  0.003 
  
(1.41) 
 
(-1.11)  (1.00)  (0.62) 
CAR (t-1) 
 
-0.001 
 
0.006**  0.003  0.001 
  
(-0.39) 
 
(2.56)  (0.61)  (0.26) 
PaR30 (t-1) 
 
-0.036*** 
 
-0.041**  -0.057***  -0.029* 
  
(-6.46) 
 
(-3.17)  (-3.97)  (-1.82) 
Regulated (YES) 
 
0.265*** 
 
0.187  0.649***  0.130 
  
 
(3.40) 
 
(1.57)  (3.79)  (0.52) 
GDP growth (t-1) -0.031** -0.029**  -0.063*  -0.008 
  (-2.36)  (-1.98)  (-1.89)  (-0.31) 
Hetero -0.058*** -0.036** -0.041*** -0.029*** -0.319*** -0.240*** -0.458*** -0.402*** 
LM test 18.43*** 7.54*** 107.41*** 105.84*** 58.46*** 43.89*** 84.36*** 97.17*** 
Observations 4,692 4,155 3,113 2,741 4,697 4,112 3,129 2,695 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hansen J statistic 23.9 17.2 30.7 24.5 26.6 24.2 25.8 25.2 
Hansen test p-value 0.20 0.57 0.043 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.15 
AR(1) p-value 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) p-value 0.16 0.15 0.34 0.77 0.85 0.78 0.49 0.98 
Number of instruments 41 49 41 49 41 49 41 49 
Wald Chi-squared test 25.2 158.6*** 35.7** 141.5*** 41.0*** 114.4*** 52.0*** 258.0*** 
Mean VIF 3.43 3.13 3.07 2.90 3.58 3.26 3.22 2.97 
Notes: Table 4 reports estimated coefficients from Eq. (4). Z-scores are shown in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Intercept, time / regional dummies are not reported.  ‘Hetero’ reports the estimated 
coefficient on the lagged squared size variable.  The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic is reported below. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second–order serial correlation in the first differenced residual. 
Lagged dependent variable is instrumented by lagged levels dated t−3 (first-differences equation) and by lagged first-differences (levels equation). Lagged control variables (i.e. total assets, active borrowers, ROA, 
OER, CAR, PaR30) are used as instruments for the levels equation only, since they are assumed to be uncorrelated with the contemporaneous error term but become endogenous in first differences. To avoid using an 
excessive number of instruments, exogenous variables (i.e. age, regulated, lagged GDP growth, regions and year) are used directly as instruments in the level equation. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 
10%  levels, respectively. 
  
 
 
 
Table 5. Key hypotheses and results for multivariate models 
 
 
Tests for growth in assets ALL Micro-bank 
Cooperatives / 
credit unions 
NBFI NGO Not-for-profit Profit 
MFI growth is independent of 
size 
Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject 
MFI growth is not persistent Cannot reject Cannot reject 
Rejected 
(negative sign) 
Cannot reject Cannot reject 
Rejected 
(negative sign) 
Cannot reject 
MFI growth variability is 
independent of size 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Cannot reject 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
      
 
Tests for growth in 
borrowers 
ALL Micro-bank 
Cooperatives / 
credit unions 
NBFI NGO Not-for-profit Profit 
Borrowers growth is 
independent of size 
Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject 
Borrowers growth is not 
persistent 
Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject Cannot reject 
Borrowers growth variability 
is independent of size 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
Rejected  
(negative sign) 
 
Note: All conclusions are drawn using the full model (Model 2) and a 5% and 1 % level of significance.   
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Table A1. Number of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) by country (Panel A) and year (Panel B) 
 
Panel A   Panel B 
Country MFIs Country MFIs Country MFIs Country MFIs Country MFIs   Year MFIs 
Afghanistan 4 Cote d'Ivoire 30 Kosovo 12 Philippines 63 Ukraine 3   2000 204 
Albania 5 Croatia 2 Kyrgyzstan 46 Poland 4 Uruguay 1   2001 311 
Angola 2 Dominican Republic 14 Laos 23 Romania 8 Uzbekistan 35   2002 484 
Argentina 19 East Timor 3 Lebanon 6 Russia 116 Venezuela 2   2003 692 
Armenia 15 Ecuador 66 Liberia 3 Rwanda 48 Vietnam 37   2004 859 
Azerbaijan 32 Egypt 16 Macedonia 4 Saint Lucia 1 Yemen 9   2005 1015 
Bangladesh 59 El Salvador 20 Madagascar 14 Samoa 1 Zambia 9   2006 1104 
Belarus 1 Ethiopia 26 Malawi 9 Senegal 54 Zimbabwe 7   2007 1121 
Belize 1 Fiji 1 Malaysia 1 Serbia 4 
  
  2008 1255 
Benin 36 Gabon 1 Mali 23 Sierra Leone 11 
  
  2009 1319 
Bhutan 1 Gambia 3 Mexico 88 Slovakia 1 
  
  2010 1342 
Bolivia 28 Georgia 17 Moldova 7 Solomon Islands 1 
  
  2011 1396 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 15 Ghana 42 Mongolia 13 South Africa 18 
  
  2012 1135 
Brazil 50 Grenada 1 Montenegro 4 South Sudan 4 
  
  2013 708 
Bulgaria 26 Guatemala 27 Morocco 11 Sri Lanka 21 
  
  2014 421 
Burkina Faso 20 Guinea 8 Mozambique 11 Sudan 2 
  
    
Burundi 19 Guinea-Bissau 4 Myanmar (Burma) 1 Suriname 3 
  
    
Cambodia 18 Guyana 1 Namibia 2 Swaziland 1 
  
    
Cameroon 31 Haiti 8 Nepal 32 Syria 2 
  
    
Central African 1 Honduras 26 Nicaragua 31 Tajikistan 46 
  
    
Chad 3 Hungary 1 Niger 14 Tanzania 21 
  
    
Chile 7 India 189 Nigeria 80 Thailand 3 
  
    
China 64 Indonesia 27 Pakistan 30 Togo 26 
  
    
China, People's Rep. 2 Iraq 12 Palestine 9 Tonga 1 
  
    
Colombia 43 Jamaica 4 Panama 5 Trinidad and Tobago 4 
  
    
Comoros 1 Jordan 6 Papua New Guinea 6 Tunisia 1 
  
    
Congo 33 Kazakhstan 44 Paraguay 7 Turkey 2 
  
    
Costa Rica 18 Kenya 39 Peru 73 Uganda 38 
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Table A2. Pairwise Pearson correlation matrix 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Growth in assets (1) 1 
         
Growth in borrowers (2) 0.5302*** 1 
        
log(Size) (3) -0.1062*** -0.1340*** 1 
       
log(Active borrowers) (4) -0.0819*** -0.0899*** 0.7647*** 1 
      
Age (5) -0.2808*** -0.3126*** 0.3860*** 0.3566*** 1 
     
ROA (6) -0.0107 -0.0759*** 0.1781*** 0.1250*** 0.1467*** 1 
    
OER (7) 0.0644*** 0.1292*** -0.2976*** -0.1664*** -0.2299*** -0.5776*** 1 
   
CAR (8) -0.0263*** 0.0163 -0.2854*** -0.2517*** -0.1672*** 0.0887*** 0.1771*** 1 
  
PaR30 (9) -0.2140*** -0.1482*** -0.0553*** -0.0900*** 0.0616*** -0.2235*** 0.0832*** -0.0065 1 
 
GDP growth (10) 0.1571*** 0.1019*** -0.0625*** 0.0046 -0.1133*** 0.0626*** -0.0717*** 0.0296*** -0.1206*** 1 
 
Notes: The reported pairwise Pearson correlations are for the panel data set (2000–2014). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table A3.  Dynamic panel estimation results using restricted samples (Dependent variable: growth in assets)  
 
 
Restricted sample: t ≥ 9 Restricted sample: i ≥ 36 Restricted sample: t≥9 & i ≥ 36 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
θ: log(Assets (t–1)) 0.013 0.029 -0.024 0.002 -0.008 0.012 
 
(0.59) (1.45) (-1.12) (0.10) (-0.32) (0.46) 
ρ: Growth in assets (t–1) 0.155 -0.109 0.171** 0.036 0.333** 0.150 
 
(1.07) (-0.88) (2.07) (0.26) (2.31) (0.78) 
Age: Young 
 
-0.824** 
 
-1.153** 
 
-0.889 
  
(-2.58) 
 
(-2.65) 
 
(-1.59) 
Age: Mature 
 
-1.145** 
 
-1.404** 
 
-1.166* 
  
(-3.12) 
 
(-2.76) 
 
(-1.73) 
ROA (t-1) 
 
0.002 
 
-0.000 
 
0.009 
  
(0.36) 
 
(-0.01) 
 
(0.93) 
OER (t-1) 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
  
(0.15) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.53) 
CAR (t-1) 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
0.001 
  
(0.39) 
 
(-0.65) 
 
(0.52) 
PaR30 (t-1) 
 
-0.036*** 
 
-0.037*** 
 
-0.021** 
  
(-5.31) 
 
(-3.38) 
 
(-2.21) 
Regulated (YES) 
 
0.191** 
 
0.211** 
 
0.290*** 
  
 
(2.78) 
 
(2.04) 
 
(3.46) 
GDP growth (t-1) -0.024** -0.011 0.005 
  (-2.45)  (-0.72)  (0.29) 
Hetero -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.070*** -0.054*** -0.026*** -0.024*** 
LM test 71.72*** 82.86*** 30.16*** 18.77*** 33.78*** 32.35*** 
Observations 5,223 4,811 3,852 3,368 2,310 2,150 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hansen J statistic 26.0 23.0 23.9 20.3 22.7 22.5 
Hansen test p-value 0.13 0.24 0.20 0.38 0.25 0.26 
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
AR(2) p-value 0.32 0.19 0.058 0.69 0.087 0.68 
Number of instruments 41 49 40 48 40 48 
Wald Chi-squared test 34.9* 167.2*** 24.0 162.7*** 46.4*** 166.8*** 
Mean VIF 2.80 2.80 3.46 3.07 2.75 2.71 
Notes: Table A3 reports estimated coefficients from Eq. (4). Z-scores are shown in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Intercept, time / regional dummies are not reported.  ‘Hetero’ reports the estimated coefficient on the lagged squared 
size variable.  The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic is reported below. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second–order serial correlation in the first differenced residual. Lagged dependent variable is instrumented by lagged levels dated 
t−3 (first-differences equation) and by lagged first-differences (levels equation). Lagged control variables (total assets, active borrowers, ROA, OER, CAR, PaR30) are used as instruments for the levels equation only, since they are assumed to be 
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uncorrelated with the contemporaneous error term but become endogenous in first differences. To avoid using an excessive number of instruments, exogenous variables (i.e. age, regulated, lagged GDP growth, regions and year) are used directly as 
instruments in the level equation. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10%  levels, respectively. 
Table A4.  Dynamic panel estimation results using restricted samples (Dependent variable: Growth in borrowers) 
 
 
Restricted sample: t ≥ 9 Restricted sample: i ≥ 36 Restricted sample: t≥9 & i ≥ 36 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
θ: log(Active borrowers (t–1)) -0.038 -0.024 -0.078 -0.038 -0.039 -0.031 
 
(-1.24) (-0.72) (-1.57) (-0.63) (-1.22) (-0.72) 
ρ: Growth in borrowers (t–1) 0.189*** 0.090 0.315*** 0.150 0.271*** 0.137 
 
(3.30) (1.22) (3.70) (1.05) (4.73) (1.10) 
Age: Young 
 
-1.143** 
 
-1.797 
 
-2.254** 
 
 
(-2.02) 
 
(-1.44) 
 
(-1.99) 
Age: Mature 
 
-1.709** 
 
-2.105 
 
-2.607** 
 
 
(-2.80) 
 
(-1.54) 
 
(-2.07) 
ROA (t-1) 
 
-0.011 
 
0.011 
 
0.014 
 
 
(-1.04) 
 
(0.77) 
 
(1.01) 
OER (t-1) 
 
0.001 
 
0.012 
 
0.011* 
 
 
(0.22) 
 
(1.64) 
 
(1.92) 
CAR (t-1) 
 
0.005 
 
0.000 
 
-0.006 
 
 
(1.39) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(-1.20) 
PaR30 (t-1) 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.038** 
 
-0.023 
 
 
(-4.12) 
 
(-2.54) 
 
(-1.55) 
Regulated (YES) 
 
0.480*** 
 
0.510** 
 
0.195 
  
 
(3.34) 
 
(2.71) 
 
(0.97) 
GDP growth (t-1) 0.002 -0.000 0.005 
  (0.09)  (-0.00)  (0.15) 
Hetero -0.204*** -0.185*** -0.348*** -0.291*** -0.158*** -0.136*** 
LM test 61.66*** 45.92*** 117.41*** 87.11*** 64.82*** 42.38*** 
Observations 5,226 4,776 3,907 3,326 2,314 2,134 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hansen J statistic 21.3 20.1 22.0 21.2 18.2 23.6 
Hansen test p-value 0.32 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.51 0.21 
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) p-value 0.14 0.33 0.016 0.27 0.03 0.15 
Number of instruments 41 49 40 48 40 48 
Wald Chi-squared test 84.4*** 150.2*** 83.0*** 309.5*** 110.4*** 201.2*** 
Mean VIF 2.90 2.87 3.64 3.22 2.87 2.83 
Notes: Table A4 reports estimated coefficients from Eq. (4). Z-scores are shown in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Intercept, time / regional dummies are not reported.  ‘Hetero’ reports the estimated coefficient on the lagged squared 
size variable.  The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic is reported below. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second–order serial correlation in the first differenced residual. Lagged dependent variable is instrumented by lagged levels dated 
t−3 (first-differences equation) and by lagged first-differences (levels equation). Lagged control variables (total assets, active borrowers, ROA, OER, CAR, PaR30) are used as instruments for the levels equation only, since they are assumed to be 
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uncorrelated with the contemporaneous error term but become endogenous in first differences. To avoid using an excessive number of instruments, exogenous variables (i.e. age, regulated, lagged GDP growth, regions and year) are used directly as 
instruments in the level equation. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 36 
 
 
Table A5.  Dynamic panel model including disclosure level as endogenous variable   
 
 
DV: Growth in assets DV: Growth in borrowers 
Endogenous Variables   
𝜃: log(Assets (t–1))  -0.011  
 (-0.21)  
𝜌: Growth in assets (t–1) 0.050  
 
(0.76)  
𝜃: log(Active borrowers (t–1))  0.075 
  (0.82) 
𝜌: Growth in borrowers (t–1)  -0.084 
  (-1.27) 
ROA (t-1) 0.002 0.009 
 (0.13) (0.27) 
OER (t-1) 0.005 0.033** 
 (0.65) (2.27) 
CAR (t-1) 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.34) (-0.30) 
PaR30 (t-1) -0.032 -0.064* 
 (-1.55) (-1.77) 
Level of disclosure (t-1) 0.265 0.137 
 (1.59) (0.36) 
Exogenous Variables   
Age: Young -0.687** -2.153*** 
 (-3.28) (-3.81) 
Age: Mature -0.857*** -2.257*** 
 (-3.44) (-3.41) 
Regulated (YES) 0.203** 0.605** 
  (2.01) (2.58) 
GDP growth (t-1) -0.028** -0.017 
 (-2.16) (-0.69) 
Hetero -0.040*** -0.170** 
LM test 27.37*** 122.08*** 
Observations 6,941 6,848 
Region FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Hansen J statistic 168.3 169.7 
Hansen test p-value 0.081 0.071 
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) p-value 1.00 0.36 
Number of instruments 175 175 
Wald Chi-squared test 104.0*** 146.4*** 
Mean VIF 2.93 3.04 
Notes: Table A5 reports estimated coefficients from Eq. (4). Z-scores are shown in parentheses below each coefficient 
estimate. Intercept, time / regional dummies are not reported.  ‘Hetero’ reports the estimated coefficient on the lagged 
squared size variable.  The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic is reported below. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and 
second–order serial correlation in the first differenced residual. Endogenous variables are instrumented by lagged levels 
dated t−3 (first-differences equation) and by lagged first-differences (levels equation). To avoid using an excessive number 
of instruments, exogenous variables (i.e. age, regulated, lagged GDP growth, regions and year) are used directly as 
instruments in the level equation.***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10%  levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
